Introduction
Social Security replacement rates are projected to fall in coming decades due to the increase in the full retirement age (which is equivalent to a 13.3% cut in benefits for a worker retiring at age 65), increasing Medicare Part B and D premiums, and increased taxation of benefits. The cut in benefits will impose hardships on low-and moderatewage workers, who are often ineligible to participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans and have few financial assets. Workers in their 40s and 50s may be particularly hard hit, as they would often need to save unfeasibly large shares of their incomes to achieve replacement rates that would allow them to maintain their preretirement standards of living.
To address the needs of these two overlapping groupslow-and moderate-wage workers and workers in their 50s with no or inadequate retirement wealth-we propose a program of cost-neutral, voluntary (at least initially) Social Security catch-up contributions, into which all workers would be defaulted starting at either age 40 or 50. The program would use the progressivity of the Social Security benefit formula to target low-wage workers and to prevent adverse selection.
The age-50 catch-up contribution would be 3.1% of salary, in addition to the existing 6.2% mandatory employee contribution rate. To avoid exacerbating labor market discrimination against older workers, the employer contribution would not be increased.
We calculated the additional benefit workers in the 1949 birth cohort would have earned had they participated in this program: it would have increased the monthly benefit of a scaled low earner by $119, from $1,012 to $1,131, and that of a scaled high earner by $199, from $2,214 to $2,413. These amounts would increase replacement rates (income in retirement divided by average preretirement earnings) by 7.2 and 3.4 percentage points to 67.9 and 40.7%, respectively. The increased Social Security benefits wouldbe insufficient to provide households with the 70 to 80% replacement rates that are often deemed appropriate (Palmer, DeStefano, Schachet, Paciero, & Bone, 2008) ; however, they would significantly reduce the shortfall that must be made up with income from employer-sponsored retirement plans and private saving.
Using cohort population mortality tables, we calculated that low-and high-earning men in the 1949 birth cohort would have earned real returns of, respectively, 3.59 and -0.39% a year on their catch-up contributions. Adjusting for socioeconomic mortality differentials, low and high earners would have earned 2.98 and 0.18% a year, respectively. Women would have earned higher returns, due to women's greater longevity. Subsequent birth cohorts would also have earned higher rates of return, because the reduction in mortality rates more than offsets the effect of legislated increases in the full retirement age.
Rate of return calculations do not take into account the value of the longevity insurance provided by Social Security. We constructed an intertemporal optimization model and showed that, for plausible coefficients of risk aversion, both high-and low-earning men would have a positive willingness to pay for the right to participate in the catch-up program, even at an assumed real risk-free rate of return on financial assets of 3%. Although stocks offer higher expected returns, the assumption of an alternative investment in risk-free assets is appropriate for almost all households, because Social Security, with bond-like investment characteristics, would substitute for bonds in the household's portfolio.
We calculated that catch-up contributions would be almost precisely actuarially neutral over a 75-year investment horizon. They would reduce the shortfall if the participation rate were higher among low lifetime earners. Conversely, they would increase the shortfall if high lifetime earners opted out. However, as indicated above, our calculations indicate that the program would increase the expected utility of high lifetime earners, and thus incent them to participate, notwithstanding the modest investment return.
Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM) simulations show that the program would have only a modest impact on the share of individuals over age 65 whose incomes fall below 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL), which is $24,120 in 2017. The impact would increase over time, but even by 2055, the share of individuals with incomes below 200% of the FPL would drop by only 10%, or 1.9 percentage points.
The Proposed Program

Current Law
Under current law, Social Security benefits are calculated as follows. First, subject to an earnings cap of $127,200 in 2017, each year's earnings are indexed by the increase in the average wage index, until age 60, after which they are not indexed. Second, the top 35 indexed earnings are summed and divided by 420 to yield the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). Third, the worker's primary insurance amount (PIA), the dollar amount of Social Security benefits payable at the worker's full retirement age, is calculated by summing three separate percentages of portions of their AIME: in 2017, 90% of the first $885, 32% of the next $4,451, and 15% of any remainder. Finally, benefits are subject to an actuarial adjustment for workers who retire before or after their full retirement age. These benefits are financed by a payroll tax of 6.2% of earnings up to the earnings cap, payable by both workers and employers.
Households are not permitted to purchase additional Social Security benefits. Policy analysts have proposed allowing households to purchase additional benefits at retirement (for example, Munnell, 2013) . These proposals have failed to gain traction because of concerns that (1) they would do nothing to help those most in need-that is, households with no annuitizable wealth-and (2) Social Security would suffer from adverse selection, with lowmortality households being disproportionately likely to participate, because they are more likely to possess annuitizable wealth.
Our Proposal
Given such concerns, we propose instead to default workers into Social Security catch-up contributions. In our base case, we assumed that catch-up contributions would start at age 50. But we also considered an alternative in which they would start at age 40. The contribution rate would be 3.1% of salary, or one-half of the existing 6.2% contribution rate. To avoid worsening labor market discrimination against older workers, the employer contribution would not increase. We propose starting with a default rather than a mandate, because we want the program to be perceived not as a tax increase, but as the purchase of valuable future benefits. Experience with 401(k) plans has shown that defaults can achieve high participation rates, even among low-wage workers (Belbase & Sanzenbacher, 2017; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2001; Clark, Utkus, & Young, 2015; Madrian & Shea, 2001 ). Below, we review the potential benefits of a mandate. We proposed age 50 because that is an age at which the saliency of retirement increases. Many workers enjoy reductions in expenditure around that age, as they repay mortgages and their children leave home. The government also signals, by permitting 401(k) and Individual Retirement Account (IRA) catch-up contributions for those aged 50 and over, that this is an appropriate age to increase retirement saving. Meanwhile, given that low-wage workers often experience declines in earnings in middle age (Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, & Song, 2015) , we evaluated an alternative in which catch-up contributions would start at age 40, but at a lower rate.
A worker participating in the catch-up program would be credited with 50% bonus earnings in his earnings record for the years he participated. Thus, a worker earning $50,000 would be credited with earnings of $75,000 instead of $50,000, and a worker earning $200,000 would be credited with earnings of $190,800 (1.5 times the taxable maximum of $127,200) instead of $127,200. AIME would be calculated as including the 50% bonus, and PIA would be based on the new AIME. Thus, any catch-up increments to AIME would yield smaller increments to Social Security benefits for workers with higher lifetime earnings, whose PIA increments would fall in the 32 or 15% segments.
Who Would Benefit and How Much
How the Catch-Up Program Targets Low Lifetime Earners
The catch-up program would exploit the progressivity of the Social Security benefit formula to target workers with low lifetime earnings. This is because workers with high lifetime earnings would be on the 15% segment of the PIA formula, whereas those with low and exceptionally low lifetime earnings would be on the 32% and 90% segments, respectively.
Who Would Not Benefit?
Regardless of current earnings, workers would not benefit if their catch-up contributions did not form part of the top 35 years in their earnings records. They would receive only partial benefits if the catch-up contributions only partially displaced another year's earnings. For example, a worker who earned a wage-indexed $40,000 a year from 20 to 55 and who participated in the catch-up program at age 56, when she earned $20,000, would receive no benefit, because 1.5 times $20,000 was not one of her top 35 years; in contrast, a worker making $28,000 when entering the catchup program would see an entry of $40,000 replaced by one of $42,000 (1.5 times $28,000), a negligible increase. This may be a significant issue for low-wage workers, whose earnings often peak around age 40 (Guvenen et al., 2015) .
How Much Would the Catch-Up Program Increase Benefits? Table 1 reports the projected effect of catch-up contributions and benefits for scaled very low, low, medium, high, and maximum earners retiring in 2016, assuming that the program had been in existence from the year 2000, when they turned 50. The scaled earnings were constructed by Clingman and Burkhalter (2013) th percentiles of the distribution of AIMEs. The career average earnings of very low, low, medium, and high hypothetical workers would be 25, 45, 100, and 160% of the average wage index, respectively.
Maximum earners would enjoy the largest dollar increase in benefits: their higher earnings would more than offset the lower benefit accrual rate resulting from being on the 15% segment of the PIA formula. Very low, low, and medium earners would all enjoy increases in replacement rates of about 7 percentage points, whereas high and maximum earners would enjoy increases in replacement rates of 3.4 and 3.8 percentage points, respectively. Even the scaled very low earners would be on on the 32% segment of the PIA formula, and thus receive percentage increases in benefits similar to those of the low earners. In all cases, the Social Security replacement rates would fall far short of the 70% many financial planners deem appropriate. But the catch-up benefits would significantly reduce the shortfalls that must be filled with income from employer-based retirement plans and private savings.
To put these increases in replacement rates in perspective, at 8.6 to 15.4% of existing benefits they would be of a similar order of magnitude to the 13.3% reduction in benefits resulting from the increase in the full retirement age from 65 to 67. They would do no more than enable succeeding birth cohorts to match the replacement rates of previous birth cohorts. To go further, catch-up contributions would need to start at younger ages (a point we return to when we report the results of DYNASIM simulations) or at a higher level.
We also reported the real rate of return on catchup contributions: that is, the rate of interest at which the expected present value of additional benefits would The catch-up program exploits the progressivity of the Social Security benefit formula to target workers with low lifetime earnings... Very low, low, and medium earners all enjoy increases in replacement rates of about 7 percentage points, whereas high and maximum earners enjoy increases in replacement rates of 3.4 and 3.8 percentage points, respectively.
equal the expected present value of catch-up contributions (see top panel of Table 2 ). This provides an indication of the overall attractiveness of the program and the extent to which it would redistribute from high to low earners. But it is an imperfect measure, because it ignores gender and socioeconomic mortality differentials, taxes on benefits, and the extent to which retired worker benefits might displace spousal benefits and increase survivor benefits. Importantly, it disregards the value of the insurance Social Security provides against both outliving one's wealth and experiencing bad labor market outcomes. Assuming male population mortality for the 1949 birth cohort, low and very low earners retiring in 2015 at age 66 would have received the highest real returns (3.59% a year), whereas high earners would have received the lowest real returns (-0.39%). Women and people in subsequent birth cohorts would receive higher returns.
But mortality varies significantly with socioeconomic status. Using the mortality factors estimated by Brown, Liebman, and Pollet (2002) , we calculated rates of return for socioeconomic subgroups. Adjusting for socioeconomic mortality differentials, a Black, male, very-low lifetime earner with less than a high school education would have earned 1.8% (vs. 3.59% using population mortality tables) and a White, male, maximum earner with a college education would have earned 0.36% (vs. -0.23%).
Incorporating Longevity Insurance
The above calculations understated the benefit of catch-up contributions, because they ignored the value of the insurance provided by Social Security. The program provides benefits in the form of an inflation-indexed lifetime annuity, a valuable benefit to households facing the problem of drawing down their wealth over an uncertain lifetime. A substantial body of literature has documented the value of this insurance (Brown & Poterba, 2000; Dushi & Webb, 2004; Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, & Brown, 1999) . It may be particularly valuable to high earners who, if they are not covered by defined benefit pensions, hold relatively little of their wealth in annuitized form. Assuming a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the marginal value of annuitization is decreasing in the share of wealth that is already annuitized.
The annuitization literature measures the value of annuities in terms of annuity equivalent wealth: that is, the percentage increase in unannuitized wealth that would leave the household indifferent between annuitizing and undertaking an optimal drawdown of unannuitized wealth. This measure is difficult to apply to our proposal, and we therefore used an alternative measure, the equivalent contribution rate: that is, the contribution rate that would leave the individual indifferent between participating and not participating. If the equivalent contribution rate were to exceed 3.1%, the individual would be better off participating; if it were to fall short, the individual would be better off not participating. We solved the model for single men and women using numerical optimization. We treated the program as riskfree. In reality, participants face the risk that benefits might be either cut or increased due to lower population growth, lower wage growth, or greater mortality rates declines than expected. We considered very low, low, medium, high, and maximum earners, and assumed coefficients of risk aversion of 2 and 5. These figures are on the low end reported in the literature, where they range from 2 to 10 depending on whether the estimates were derived from portfolio theory, purchases of insurance, economic experiments, or preferences over lotteries (Chetty, 2003) . In each period from ages 22 to 66, participants receive labor market income, pay Social Security taxes, and decide how much to consume. In our base case, savings were invested in a risk-free asset yielding a 3% real return. In our alternative, we assumed a 1% real return. In retirement, participants receive Social Security benefits and undertake an optimal drawdown of unannuitized wealth.
The results reported in this paper assume population mortality. Brown (2000) showed that socioeconomic differences in mortality have very little effect on an individual's willingness to pay for an annuity. Our analysis abstracted from labor market risk and therefore understated willingness to pay. One of the less widely-appreciated benefits of Social Security is that it provides insurance against bad labor market outcomes by providing workers with low lifetime earnings access to higher rates of return on contributions. But there is considerable heterogeneity in labor market risk, and therefore the value of this insuranceand modeling both the distribution of risk and its effect on equivalent contribution rates-is beyond the scope of this paper. Table 3 reports equivalent contribution rates. At a coefficient of risk aversion of 5, and assuming a real return of 3%, equivalent contribution rates would exceed 3.1% for both men and women at all income levels. Workers at all income levels would be better off participating. At a coefficient of risk aversion of 2, high-earning men would have an equivalent contribution rate of 3.0% and would be better off not participating. But all other groups would still be better off in the program, some by large amounts. For example, at a coefficient of risk aversion of 5, female medium earners would be willing to pay a contribution rate of 8.4% of income, with lower-income workers willing to pay a lower contribution rate. A 3% real return is considerably higher than the current interest rate on risk-free assets. At an assumed return of 1%, still higher than the January 2017 figure of a 0.42% yield on 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected securities, the program would be attractive to both men and women at all income levels and at both assumed coefficients of risk aversion (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2017).
DYNASIM Analysis
The above analysis of prototypical workers provided an incomplete picture of the costs, benefits, and distributional consequences of the proposed reform. It focused on how it would have affected workers approaching retirement had it been implemented 20 years ago, rather than on how it might affect succeeding birth cohorts. It abstracted from program interactions-for example, the effects on spousal and survivor benefits-and on eligibility for Supplementary Security Income and Medicaid. It disregarded behavioral responses, and it failed to capture the rich variety of demographic and economic events households experience over their lifetimes. We therefore reported the simulated impact of the program, estimated using the Urban Institute DYNASIM microsimulation model (Favreault, Smith, & Johnson, 2015) . DYNASIM is parameterized using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The model "ages" the data year by year, simulating both demographic events, such as births, deaths, marriages, and divorces, and economic events, such as labor force participation, earnings, hours of work, disability onset, and retirement. The model simulates Social Security coverage and benefits; calculates Supplementary Security Income eligibility, participation, and benefits; and allows researchers to simulate the distributional effects of policy interventions by year and by a variety of socioeconomic characteristics.
Urban Institute ran four sets of simulations on our behalf, assuming (1) a 50% increase in contributions starting at age 50, (2) a 30% increase at age 40, (3) that current law benefits would continue to be paid, and (4) that on exhaustion of the Social Security Trust Fund, benefits would limited to payroll tax receipts. Reflecting the theoretical calculations of willingness to pay referred to above, and the empirical evidence that defaults can achieve high 401(k) participation rates (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2006) , we assumed 100% participation. We further assumed zero crowd-out of retirement and nonretirement savings. Crowd-out would be zero among those currently saving nothing for retirement, and we hypothesized that the 401(k) contributions of other households would be influenced by social norms and the desire to earn an employer match, rather than by a desire to smooth the marginal utility of consumption, so that 401(k) contribution rates might change slowly, if at all. Table 4 reports the impact of catch-up contributions starting at age 50, assuming current law benefits continue to be paid. It shows the percentage point impact on the share of individuals aged 62 or over with incomes below 200% of the FPL ($24,120 in 2017 for a single individual) for years 2015, 2025, and through to 2065, analyzed by gender, education, ethnicity, and shared lifetime earnings quintile (computed as half the couple's earnings in years a person is married and one's own earnings in years they are unmarried). The impact of the program would increase over time, reflecting the fact that those currently near or in retirement would have limited or no opportunity to participate. By 2055, the share of elderly individuals with incomes less than 200% of the FPL would have decreased by 1.9 percentage points relative to a baseline of 19.8%: a 10% decline. The percentage point reduction in poverty would be only slightly greater for women than for men.
The percentage point in the share of individuals with incomes below 200% of the FPL would decline with both educational attainment and lifetime income quintile, except for those with less than a high school education and above, and in the lowest shared lifetime income quintile. The explanation for the limited impact on the share in poverty of those in the lowest shared lifetime income quintile is that, although they would enjoy similar percentage increases in per capita net cash income to the second quintile (5.2 vs. 5.6% by 2055), their dollar increase would be much smaller ($613 vs. $1,301 a year), reflecting their much smaller projected pre-catch-up Social Security benefits ($9,039 vs. $15,251). A similar explanation held for those with less than a high school education. We concluded that this, and perhaps other similar proposals to expand Social Security coverage, would be of very limited benefit to workers who are marginally attached to the labor force. Table 5 reports the impact on the Trust Fund over 25-, 50-, and 75-year horizons. Over a 25-year horizon, the reform would narrow the actuarial shortfall from 1.45% to 0.93% of payroll, reflecting additional payroll tax receipts that would not be matched by additional benefit payments. Over a 75-year horizon, the reform would be almost exactly actuarially neutral, increasing the shortfall from 2.82 to 2.83% of payroll. Thus, the program would not contribute to bridging the actuarial shortfall, but this was not its objective, and other policy instruments are available for that purpose. However, the program would postpone exhaustion of the Trust Fund from 2034 to 2037, reflecting increased payroll tax receipts.
Impact on the Trust Fund
Other Considerations
We did not consider macroeconomic effects such as the impact on the capital stock. Increases in the Trust Fund might increase aggregate savings. Conversely, catch-up contributions might crowd out private savings. We hypothesized that any such effects would be small. The proposal would increase the Trust Fund by $842 billion in 2025, a tiny amount in relation to the nation's capital stock or even the total stock of financial assets.
Alternative Design Features
Should Catch-Up Contributions Start Earlier Than Age 50?
Our base case assumed that catch-up contributions would start at age 50. We chose age 50 because it is the age at which (1) the need to save for retirement may become more salient, (2) workers become eligible to make catch-up IRA and 401(k) contributions, and (3) many households enjoy increases in disposable income as children leave home and Over a 75-year horizon, the reform is almost exactly actuarially neutral, increasing the shortfall from 2.82 to 2.83 percent of payroll. mortgages are paid off (Scholz, Seshadri, & Khitatrakun, 2006) .
Low-wage workers, the primary target of our intervention, often exit the labor market at relatively young ages and experience earnings declines in their 50s, and they might therefore benefit little from the additional contributions. Research by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, & Song (2015) showed that all but the highest percentiles of the distribution of lifetime earnings experience earnings declines from age 45 to 55. The pattern reported in Figure 5a of their paper was captured in differences between the age earnings profiles of our stylized very low, low, medium, high, and maximum earners.
We therefore modeled an alternative in which contributions would begin at age 40, but contributions would be increased by 30%, rather than by the 50% in our base case. Table 6 reports the impact on the share of individuals aged 62 and over with incomes below 200% of the FPL. The reductions in poverty would be similar to those achieved with catch-up contributions starting at age 50. The reductions would be smaller in the early years (0.1 vs. 0.3%), reflecting the smaller impact on workers currently close to retirement. By 2065, the reductions would have a slightly larger effect on the second shared lifetime income and an identical effect on the bottom quintile. We concluded that starting contributions at age 40 would not achieve the goal of targeting workers with very low lifetime earnings while delaying build-up of programmatic benefits.
Relative to the base case, DYNASIM simulations showed that starting contributions at age 40 would slightly reduce the 75-year actuarial shortfall, by 0.11% of payroll, because it would take longer for the program to mature. Starting at age 40 would also slightly reduce the rate of return on contributions-and thus the attractiveness of the program-because the time interval between the payment of contributions and receipt of benefits would increase. Thus, the returns to men and women in the 1949 birth cohort would decline 0.66 and 0.88%, to 2.93 and 2.73 %, respectively.
Why Not a Mandate?
A mandate might be politically difficult to pass and would be unnecessary if a voluntary opt-out program would otherwise achieve close to universal participation. If participation were less than universal, the economic case for a mandate would depends on who was opting out, and why. If policymakers believed that households were acting myopically in opting out, they might choose to mandate participation for paternalistic reasons. The paternalistic case for a mandate might be even stronger if low earners, who are often at the highest risk of poverty in old age, were opting out. But some households might be acting rationally by choosing to opt out. Risk-tolerant high earners might believe they could earn higher returns elsewhere. Low earners who owned their home, anticipated receiving income from a defined benefit pension plan, or experienced a reduction in needs when children left home might already be saving sufficiently for retirement (Pang & Schieber, 2014) . Mandating participation would decrease their expected discounted lifetime utility.
The impact of opt-outs on the financial sustainability of the proposal would depend on who was opting out. Optouts by low earners would generally improve sustainability, because low earners would enjoy high returns. Conversely, opt-outs by high earners could reduce sustainability, create pressure to reduce the generosity of catch-up benefits, and lead to a "death spiral" in which an increasing share of workers might choose not to participate.
A mandate would avoid the risks of both a death spiral and opt-outs by vulnerable populations. It would also be within the spirit of Social Security and other social insurance programs that use mandates to both broaden the risk pool and protect it against adverse selection.
The Credibility of the Government's Promise
In contrast to 401(k) and IRA plans that confer clear property rights on the participant, Social Security benefits may be reduced if tax receipts and Trust Fund balances are insufficient to pay scheduled benefits (Morton & Liou, 2016) . The program currently faces an actuarial shortfall, and fear of a benefit cut might deter workers from participating. The government should consider accompanying the reform by measures designed to restore actuarial balance.
Why Not Leave the Problem to the Market?
Insurance companies currently offer immediate inflationindexed annuities. In theory, they could also offer deferred inflation-indexed annuities, with premiums payable at ages 50 to 66 and benefits starting at age 66, exactly mimicking Social Security catch-up contributions. A deferred annuity would allow workers to benefit from mortality credits (the increment to returns resulting from the reallocation of income from those who die to those who survive) from age 50 rather than from the age benefits would commence. A potential concern is that, were the catch-up program to be successful, insurance companies might disrupt the risk pool by offering more attractive terms to high earners, who would earn low real returns in the catch-up program.
To examine this concern, first, we identified the highest-paying male single life inflation-indexed immediate annuity, with benefits starting at age 66 (on December 5, 2016, the highest-paying company offered a monthly benefit of $389.63 for a $100,000 premium). Using the Society of Actuaries 2012 Individual Annuity Mortality Basic Table and Projection Scale G2, we calculated the real rate of interest at which the expected present value of benefits would equal the premium (American Academy of Actuaries, 2011). Then, using the same real rate of interest and annuitant mortality tables, we calculated the premium, expressed as a percentage of salary that an insurance company would need to charge a high-income worker to provide the same benefits he would obtain under the catch-up program. If the premium was less than 3.1% of salary, the worker would be better off buying the annuity; if it was greater than 3.1% of salary, the worker would be better off staying in the catch-up program. For the 1949 birth cohort, an insurance company would need to charge men and women 4.0 and 4.4% of salary, respectively, and for the 1965 birth cohort, 3.9 and 4.3% of salary, respectively; for both cohorts, these rates would be considerably more than 3.1%. Thus, the catch-up program could both target low earners and offer high earners a return that would be better than what could be offered on the financial markets.
How Do Federal and State Taxes Affect the Results?
The above analyses disregarded federal and state income taxes. Employee Social Security contributions are payable out of after-tax income. The Social Security benefits of low-and moderate-income retirees are not taxed. Only part of the benefits of higher-income retirees are taxed (see Mahaney & Carlson [2007] for a discussion on the tax treatment of Social Security benefits). The economic policy rationale for partial taxation of Social Security benefits is to create symmetry between the tax treatment of Social Security taxes and benefits. The employer's share of the payroll tax is excluded from tax (the employer deducts it as a business expense, but the contribution is not included in the employee's taxable income), but the employee's share is paid out of taxable income. As catch-up contributions would be paid out of taxed income, it would be consistent to exempt from income tax the share of Social Security benefits attributable to catch-up contributions.
Conclusions
The United States faces a retirement savings crisis (Munnell, Rutledge, & Webb, 2014) . Working longer is, at best, only a partial solution (Munnell & Sass, 2008) . Further, increasing savings is not a solution for households approaching retirement with little wealth. They would have to save implausibly large amounts to hit conventional replacement rate targets (Munnell, Golub-Sass, & Webb, 2011) .
Low-wage workers would benefit most from catch-up contributions, but theoretical calculations show that even workers with high lifetime incomes would benefit from participation once the value of the additional longevity insurance provided by the program is considered. Importantly, high earners would be better off making catch-up contributions than purchasing even an optimally-designed annuity from an insurance company. The DYNASIM model showed that, over a 75-year horizon, the program would have almost no effect on the Social Security actuarial shortfall; however, it was not one of our goals to address the shortfall, and other policy instruments exist for that purpose.
The DYNASIM model showed that the program would have only a modest effect on the shares of the elderly population with incomes below the FPL, or below 200% of the FPL. By 2065, it would reduce the share below 100% of the FPL from 5.7 to 5.3%, almost all in the bottom shared lifetime income quintile. The Social Security program links benefit entitlement to payroll tax contributions. The progressivity of the benefit formula notwithstanding, it provides only limited protection to those only marginally attached to the labor force. Other policy instruments, such as Supplementary Security Income, a means-tested noncontributory benefit, may be a more effective means of targeting this group.
This study showed that Social Security catch-up contributions would reduce-but not eliminate-the gap between retirement savings and the amounts required to maintain pre-retirement consumption. Absent an unprecedentedly large increase in Social Security benefits and taxes, most workers will continue to need employment-based pensions to maintain their standard of living in retirement. However, the current 401(k) system fails the majority of workers. Many are ineligible to participate, not all eligible workers participate, savings often leak out through preretirement withdrawals, excessive fees erode retirement savings, plans earn subpar returns, and workers lack a cost-effective way of converting accumulated wealth into postretirement income.
